Transferts et redistribution familiale collective
Abstract
Transfers and familial collective redistribution. The debate on the financing of pensions largely neglects the redistributive action of the family. Older generations make financial transfers both to their children and grandchildren in return for the pensions they receive. We suggest a collective model of private transfers which takes into account provisions to a family public good and where grandparents and parents give money to young adult households. We successively examine the possibility of a consensus between the donors, non-cooperative and Pareto efficient contributions to the children. The econometric results based on a French survey on solidarities within trigenerational families reject both the income pooling and the noncooperative cases, but not the efficiency hypothesis, revealing that retired grandparents play a significant role in the familial transfer system.
Transfers and familial collective redistribution. The debate on the financing of pensions largely neglects the redistributive action of the family. Older generations make financial transfers both to their children and grandchildren in return for the pensions they receive. We suggest a collective model of private transfers which takes into account provisions to a family public good and where grandparents and parents give money to young adult households. We successively examine the possibility of a consensus between the donors, non-cooperative and Pareto efficient contributions to the children. The econometric results based on a French survey on solidarities within trigenerational families reject both the income pooling and the noncooperative cases, but not the efficiency hypothesis, revealing that retired grandparents play a significant role in the familial transfer system. Résumé Le débat sur le financement des retraites ignore largement l'action redistributrice de la famille. Les générations âgées versent en retour de leurs pensions des transferts financiers à la fois à leurs enfants et à leurs petits-enfants. Nous proposons un modèle de transfert collectif avec un bien public familial tel que les grands-parents et les parents versent de l'argent aux jeunes générations. On étudie successivement la possibilité d'un consensus entre les aidants, des contributions au bien public non coopératives au sens de Nash et efficaces. Les résultats économétriques obtenus à partir d'une enquête française sur des familles trigénérationnelles rejettent l'hypothèse de mise en commun des ressources et de non-coopération, mais ne sont pas incompatibles avec l'efficacité parétienne. Ils indiquent l'existence d'un pouvoir de décision propre pour les grands-parents retraités dans le système de transferts familiaux.
Origin : Publisher files allowed on an open archive